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This is an insightful and important book. Post-Soviet Power presents a sophisticat-
ed and dynamic account of the transformation of the Russian electricity sector—
“the backbone of the Russian economy” from the early 1990s until 2008, when the 
team of liberal reformers headed by Anatolii Chubais managed to complete the 
process of restructuring the state energy monopoly United Energy Systems (UES). 
The study views the economics and politics of post-Soviet institutional building in 
the electricity sector as closely intertwined and mutually constitutive processes. 
Moreover, it considers the process of marketization as a pathway to “post-Soviet 
developmentalism”—a flexible and multifaceted process of institutional innova-
tion and “self-discovery,” to use economist Dani Rodrik’s phrase (p. 52). 
The study relies on detailed empirical process tracing, based on interview data, 
combined with a thorough reading of the Russian press and two original data sets, 
compiled by the author, concerning asset ownership and subsidy regimes in the elec-
tricity sector. The book positions itself as a bridge between economic sociology and 
the political economy of development. 
Post-Soviet Power traces the transformation of the Russian post-Soviet energy 
sector from “ministry to market” involving the processes of unbundling (of gen-
eration from transmission and retail), restructuring, and the sale of assets. Su-
sanne Wengle points to the irregular pattern of liberal and illiberal elements which 
characterize the resulting market arrangements and invites us to consider the 
intense politics of this process. The novelty of her approach comes through when 
she underscores the significant change that has taken place as a result of post-
Soviet restructuring. This, as she points out, presents a qualitatively different ap-
proach to the “deficit model” described by Stephen J. Collier and Lucan Way (p. 
38), an approach that concerns itself with measuring the distance between Rus-
sia’s seemingly failed reforms and market ideals. Further, the book’s argument de-
parts from the themes of state capture, rent seeking, and corruption by state ac-
tors that often underlie the accounts of Russian reforms. While highlighting that 
such processes cannot by any means be written off, seeing reform politics as pure 
“strategies for self-enrichment among political elites obscures other important 





















Such important variables include ideas of post-Soviet developmentalism and 
ongoing developmental bargains between different sets of actors. Among important 
actors considered in the book are the country’s top leadership (Presidents Boris Yelt-
sin and Vladimir Putin), the team of liberal reformers centered around Chubais, re-
gional governors (particularly of Moscow, Irkutsk, and Primorskiy Krai), and large 
oligarchic conglomerates, notably Gazprom and Rusal. Post-Soviet developmental-
ism as an idea and as a process represented a dynamic agenda that had different 
champions at different times: liberal reformers, regional governors particularly influ-
ential in the 1990s, and different factions within the federal bureaucratic elite dur-
ing the 2000s. Each of these actors contributed different nuanced meanings to the 
notion of country’s social, economic, and political development and the place of the 
energy sector. Simple everyday phrases such as “keeping the lights on” and “factory 
doors open” encapsulated what the actors were striving for. Their interactions be-
hind these notions were anything but simple. Their bargains involved often-unlikely 
alliances. Their degree of influence changed over time and the locus of policy action 
shifted from the regional to federal level because of the recentralization of authority 
in the early 2000s. Only accounting for such variables and dynamics, Post-Soviet Pow-
er argues, will allow an understanding of the geographically differentiated pattern of 
market arrangements that were forged as a result of the liberalization of the Russian 
electricity sector by the late 2000s. 
The book claims to make three distinct contributions to Russian studies, to po-
litical economy, and to comparative development literatures. 
The book’s significance for Russian studies is in problematizing actors’ inter-
twined interests and ideas. These stem from their positions within regional and in-
ternational contexts and represent sources of their preferences in the complex pro-
cess of post-Soviet institutional building. Such conceptualization challenges the 
predominant “predatory state” view that places patrimonialism at the heart of all 
political development (Gel’man 2016). Further, the account of marketization of the 
electricity sector in the book departs from the usual explanation of such dynamics as 
an application of liberal recipes, which had to be compromised by giving concession 
to the defenders of the status quo. Post-Soviet Power sees this process as evolving 
developmental pacts between government and business conglomerates, each having 
active positions and ideas about the objectives and principles of post-Soviet devel-
opmentalism. Finally, the book demonstrates the mutual reflexivity of economic and 
political development. “Liberalization and marketization not only transform eco-
nomic institutions; they also reshape authority structures” (p. 51). The eventual 
liberalization of the UES not only delivered the transformation of the electricity sec-
tor but also undercut the influence of regional governors, thus advancing President 
Putin’s state-building project. 
There are also several implications for comparative political economy. One is 
related to the political economy of privatization that is linked to the above view of 
oligarchic conglomerates, important counterparties to the liberalization process, as 
complex economic and political actors. This is contrary to the new owners being seen 
as pure private (virtuous) firms, or bad early winners and rent-seekers. Moreover, the 
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finding about the mutually constitutive nature of politics and economics of develop-
ment challenges an influential institutionalist strand in the political economy litera-
ture that interprets growth as a function of institutional stability (North 1991) and 
“inclusive political institutions” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2013). Post-Soviet Power, 
by contrast, presents a picture in which politics and economics are defined via a tem-
poral reflexive process of institutional innovation, rather than seeing one element, 
the political realm, being exogenous to the process of development. 
The third contribution is to comparative development literature. This contribu-
tion follows from the last point about the book’s interpretation of development as 
being rooted in actors’ evolving ideas of developmentalism and fluid political pacts 
situated within regional and international economies. This argument chimes with 
contemporary research about the flexible and enabling developmental state. Spe-
cifically, it contributes a vision of regional differentiation of developmental strate-
gies within a single country. 
The introduction and chapter 1 present the book’s puzzle relating to the pattern 
of liberal and illiberal arrangements that were forged in the Russian electricity sector 
by the late 2000s and put forward the arguments outlined above. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the political power bargains that provided the bases for 
energy sector marketization. It offers an analysis of the factors that enabled the pas-
sage of the Law on Energy in 2003. These included the centralization of the federal 
authority, the transformation of executive-legislative relations, and a seemingly im-
probable alliance between the liberal and the siloviki factions of the government.
Chapter 3, which concludes part 1 of the book, is devoted to three types of su-
praregional pacts that shaped the landscape of institutional arrangements in the 
Russian energy sector after its restructuring. Three powerful counterparties to the 
bargains in the three broad territorial zones—European Russia, Siberia, and the Far 
East—were Gazprom, Rusal, and the Far East power plants. The chapter applies a 
constructivist conceptualization of physical infrastructure, “things,” as ideas that 
legitimize interests and are validated—“naturalized”—by actors’ discourses in the 
course of institutional bargains (pp. 51, 106–107). 
Part 2 of the book examines the emergence of the three types of regimes in the 
Russian electricity sector: ownership (chapter 4), subsidies (chapter 5), and exper-
tise regime (chapter 6). The conclusion reviews the arguments of the book as out-
lined above. 
The limitations of the book’s argument derive from its strength. This reader 
would particularly like to point to the theoretical treatment of ideas and their rela-
tionship to interests. Wengle’s effort to build an argument linking interests and 
ideas with the temporal dimension of institutional construction is highly commend-
able in the field of Russian studies, where with few exceptions “ideas hardly matter; 
while interests reign supreme” as an explanation for social phenomena (p. 131). Yet, 
Wengle notes that social science puts us in front of a choice whether it is indeed 
ideas or interests that are key to understanding change, whereas her argument un-
derlines the interaction of the two (p. 131). In addition, Post-Soviet Power features 
parallel definitions of ideas: ideas as “imagined” physical infrastructure (chapter 3) 
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and expert ideas (chapter 6). These two dimensions of the argument could benefit 
from bringing in the insights of historical institutionalist literature (see Fioretos, 
Falleti, and Sheingate 2016). Through the prism of this influential tradition in politi-
cal science, Wengle’s “physical legacies” are institutions. They exist as long as actors 
have an interest in them and can morph or be abandoned altogether as interests 
shift, just as Wengle demonstrates in her study. Expert ideas, by contrast, are ide-
ational variables on which historical institutionalists draw for explaining processes 
of change in interaction with interest-related variables. 
This criticism aside, Post-Soviet Power makes an important contribution to the 
literature. It is theoretically sophisticated, rich in empirical detail, and written in an 
engaging and lively style. It advances our understanding of the processes of marketi-
zation and liberalization and of social change more generally. It is thoroughly rec-
ommended to anyone interested in Russian post-Soviet transformation, political 
economy, and development. 
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